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FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Connally v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 546 (1977).
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 619 (1977).
United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977).
United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977).
In three recent decisions1 the Supreme Court
has taken the opportunity to define and de-
lineate further a citizen's rights under the
fourth amendment.2 In United States v. Chad-
wick3 the Court held that defendants' fourth
amendment rights were violated when federal
agents opened, without a search warrant, a
200-pound footlocker lawfully seized and re-
moved from the open trunk of a stationary
car, even where the agents had probable cause
to believe the footlocker contained contraband.
However, in United States v. Rarmsey4 the Court
held that a customs officer who noticed eight
bulky letters from Thailand, which all ap-
peared to have been addressed with the same
typewriter, had reasonable cause to suspect
they contained contraband and was therefore
I United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977);
United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977); G. M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 619 (1977).
In a fourth case, Connally v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 546
(1977), the Court held that where a state statute, GA.
CoDE ANN. § 24-1601 (1967), provided that a justice
of the peace who issued a warrant would receive a
five-dollar fee, but no fee for a denial of the warrant;
"[t]he situation... [was] one which offers 'a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge,"' and
violated the protections given to the defendant by
the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the Con-
stitution. Id. at 548-49. Connally had been convicted
of possession of marijuana in violation of the Georgia
Controlled Substances Act, GA. CODE ANN. ch. 79A-
8 (1975), after his house had been raided and
searched pursuant to a search warrant issued in the
manner provided for in the statute.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
3 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977).
" 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977).
authorized by statute to make a warrantless
search. Such a search did not violate the fourth
amendment, and since postal regulations
strictly prohibit the reading of any correspond-
ence without a search warrant, there was no
chill of defendants first amendment rights.
Finally, in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States'
the Court held that a warrantless seizure of
automobiles parked in public places was per-
missible to satisfy the income tax liability of an
individual taxpayer who was the appellant cor-
poration's general manager. However, a war-
rantless search of appellant's office and seizure
of papers found there was, in the absence of
any exigent circumstances, a violation of the
fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment was included in the
Bill of Rights in response to the general war-
rants, "writs of assistance," by which the Eng-
lish Crown had given colonial customs officials
sweeping authority to search virtually anywhere
for goods imported into the colonies in viola-
tion of British tax laws. Denounced in 1761,6
these writs were an early focal point of colonial
opposition to the Crown. Ironically, however,
the new United States government soon passed
legislation which guarded its own revenue
nearly as jealously as the British government
had guarded its colonial income. The first
customs statute7 provided for warrantless
5 97 S. Ct. 619 (1977).6 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625
(1886); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965).
7 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43. Section
24 of the statute provided:
[E]very collector ... shall have full power and
authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which
they shall have reason to suspect any goods,
wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be
concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and
secure any such goods, wares or merchandise;
and if they shall have cause to suspect a conceal-
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searches of vessels and ships, though not of
private dwellings or buildings, and may be
seen, therefore, to have outlined the first ex-
ception to the fourth amendment requirement
of a search warrant.
Other exceptions to the amendment devel-
oped much later, in the twentieth century, and
most of these may be seen to be specific in-
stances of the later-enunciated doctrine of exi-
gent circumstances8 mentioned in Ramsey.
However, these exceptions were developed
piecemeal, and only hindsight enables one to
fit them into such a framework. The first major
exception, which allows warrantless search and
seizure incident to arrest, was stated in dictum
by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks
v. United States9 in 1914. The doctrine was
embellished ten years later in Carroll v. United
States1" where the Court interpreted the Na-
tional Prohibition Act" as authorizing federal
prohibition agents to stop, search and seize,
without a warrant, an automobile believed to
be transporting bootleg liquor.12 This ruling
became known as the automobile exception.
The government's case in Chadwick was based
on these two exceptions. The broader doctrine
of exigent circumstances was first mentioned
in dictum in McDonald v. United States ,i3 where
Justice Douglas said, "We cannot ... excuse
the absence of a search warrant without a
showing ... that the exigencies of the situation
ment thereof, in any particular dwelling-house,
store, building, or other place, they .. . shall,
upon application on oath or affirmation to any
justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to
enter such house, store, or other place (in the
day time only) and there to search for such
goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and
secure the same for trial....
8 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 683 (4th ed. rev. 1968),
defiies exigency in part as "any event or occasional
combination of circumstances, calling for immediate
action or remedy."
9 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
10 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
11 Tit. 2, §§ 25, 26 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923,
§ 10138'/2 m, 10138'/2 mm), 41 Stat. 305, 315; § 6 of
supplemental act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923,
§ 101842).
12 See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT 90 (1966), where a distinction is
drawn between goods seized for lack of duty paid
and those seized to be used as evidence in a criminal
prosecution. Landynski finds faulty the Court's rea-
soning that the long tradition of warrantless search
and seizure in the area of customs searches justifies a
warrantless search for criminal evidence.
13 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
made that course imperative. ' ' 14 Other excep-
tions to the warrant requirement were listed in
a recent court of appeals opinion:' 5 (1) hot
pursuit, (2) plain view doctrine, (3) emergency
doctrine, and (4) consent. With the exception
of the last, all may be considered specific sorts
of exigent circumstances.
Because the fourth amendment flatly pro-
hibits unreasonable search and seizure, a
search, to be constitutional, must be found to
be reasonable. When exigent circumstances,
whether the general doctrine or one of the
specific exceptions, are pleaded as justification
for a warrantless search, the Court must decide
whether the asserted exigencies are sufficient-
whether they are truly "exigent." If the Court
determines that they are, the search is reason-
able and thereby constitutional. With warrant-
less searches based on no exigency, the analysis
is the same, in that the search, whether author-
ized by statute or alleged to be justified by
some non-exigency based exception to the
fourth amendment, must still be found to be
reasonable. Because of the underlying value of
the fourth amendment's protections and be-
cause of the Court's own interpretation that
review by a neutral magistrate is essential when
a citizen's privacy is at stake," the threshold
for entry into the area of reasonableness is
high. The burden is placed on the party seek-
ing an exception, or the broadening of an
existing exception, to the rule."
The Court in its recent decisions seems to be
adhering to Justice Powell's concern, expressed
in his concurrence to United States v. Watson,'8
that the exceptions to the warrant requirement
remain tightly restricted and clearly drawn.
The reasoning in all three cases may be seen to
revolve around a citizen's expectations of pri-
vacy with regard to international mail," in an
office"0 and in regard to locked luggage.
21
Where these expectations were seen to be war-
ranted and reasonable, the Court held that
14 Id. at 456.
15 United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76 (2d Cir.
1973).
" See Connally v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 546 (1977).
17 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
18423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)).
19 United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977).
20 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 97 S. Ct.
619 (1977).
21 United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977).
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only a search warrant can justify an intrusion.22
But in an area where search is routine and
indeed often physically intrusive, as in border
searches, expectations of privacy are not com-
monly held, and therefore, warrantless search
is permissible.23
In United States v. Chadwick, Amtrak officials
in San Diego had noticed that a man and
woman boarding a train for Boston were carry-
ing with them a large footlocker which was
leaking talcum powder, a substance train offi-
cials knew was often used to mask the odor of
marijuana. The male passenger also matched a
profile used to spot drug traffickers. Federal
agents, informed of these facts, were on hand
two days later when the train arrived in Boston.
A trained dog sniffed the footlocker when it
had been unloaded in the station and gave a
signal to the agents indicating that a controlled
substance was contained therein, but the agents
waited to make their arrests until a third person
had arrived with a car. The 200-pound foot-
locker had been loaded into the trunk of this
vehicle when the arrests were made. The agents
had neither arrest nor search warrants. The
car, footlocker and arrestees were taken to the
federal building in Boston, and one and one-
half hours later the double-locked footlocker
was opened there with keys found upon the
male passenger. Large amounts of marijuana
were found in the footlocker, and respondents
were indicted for possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute and for conspiring to pos-
sess with intent to distribute .24
Before trial in the district court25 the defend-
ants moved to suppress the marijuana obtained
by search of the footlocker. The government,
having conceded that no warrant had been
issued for the search, contended that it was
nevertheless valid under the automobile excep-
tion of Carroll or as a search incident to arrest.
In considering the automobile exception, the
court pointed out that "[t]he word 'automobile'
is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears, ' 2 6 and
distinguished Chambers v. Maroney-7 where a
22 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 97 S. Ct.
619 (1977); United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476
(1977).
23 United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977).
24 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1), 846 (1970).
?5 United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763 (D.
Mass. 1975).
26 Id. at 772 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
27 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
warrantless search of an automobile had taken
place at the police station after a late-night
arrest of four defendants seated in the car in a
parking lot. In Chambers, the Court found the
search permissible, Justice White reasoning
that it was a choice between a warrantless search
or a warrantless seizure while a search warrant
was sought and that since both courses of action
were equally intrusive on the defendants, either
was "reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment."28 The exigency which would have justi-
fied an immediate search of the auto-that it
might be driven away if the police were re-
quired to leave to seek a warrant-was ex-
tended in time to justify the later warrantless
search. In Chadwick, the district court found
no such exigency and indeed no "nexus" at all
between the search and the auto.2 9 It was the
footlocker, not the auto, which had been
searched, and the court saw it as a mere coinci-
dence that the footlocker was resting in the
trunk of a car, rather than on a platform in
the station or upon the ground at the time of
the arrests. Had the arrests taken place when
the footlocker was in either of the latter places,
a warrant would have been required; the auto-
mobile exception could not be invoked on such
a tenuous basis. The court went on to point
out that the Carroll exception and its extensions
were based on the presence of some exigency,
some danger that the object of the search might
be "spirited away."30 A double-locked, 200-
pound footlocker in a stationary car could not
be whisked away by three defendants who had
all been handcuffed and escorted to govern-
ment cars. Furthermore, railroad guards and
city policemen, as well as federal agents, were
present at the scene of the arrest.
In considering the government's contention
that the footlocker search was valid as incident
to arrest, 3' the court referred to a test relied
upon in Chimel v. California.3 There the Su-
28Id. at 52.
29 393 F. Supp. at 772.
30 Id. at 773.
31 After the district court had considered the Gov-
ernment's arguments concerning the automobile ex-
ception and had granted defendants' motion to sup-
press, the Government filed motions to reconsider
and to vacate. In support of these motions, the
Government then introduced evidence to support its
contention that the incident to arrest exception to
the warrant requirement justified the warrantless
search of the footlocker. The court then made a
supplemental fact finding which is included in its
opinion. 393 F. Supp. at 774.
32 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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preme Court had outlined the parameters of
the area, as opposed to the person, which
could be searched incident to an arrest. The
"'area within [a defendant's] immediate con-
trol' . . . the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence"33 could legally be searched without a
warrant. Applying-this test to Chadwick's case,
the district court concluded that a double-
locked, 200-pound footlocker which was in the
open trunk of a car at the time of the arrests
was not within the defendants' immediate con-
trol at that point.
The government appealed its case, and the
court of appeals, 34 after pointing out that ex-
ceptions to the fourth amendments must be
well-defined and few in number 35 and that the
burden was on the party seeking to fit within
an exception," summarized with approval the
district court's reasoning in regard to the auto-
mobile exception.
In pressing its contention that the search of
the footlocker was valid as incident to the
arrests, the government attacked the district
court's reliance on Chimel, stating that that
ruling was applicable only to searches of dwell-
ings. The court was not persuaded and noted
that the Chimel test had been employed in
circumstances involving searches outside of
dwellings.3 7 The court refused to accept the
government's proposed test of "reasonable-
ness," stating that its duty was to consider
whether the facts of the search at bar justified
its inclusion in any established exception. Al-
though the court conceded that it had upheld
a warrantless search of a hand-carried briefcase
at the scene of an arrest, 38 it distinguished such
handheld luggage from the footlocker involved
in Chadwick: handheld luggage was more closely
related to the personal effects found on an
arrestee, which may be searched without a
warrant as incident to the arrest.39 The court
further admitted that some baggage was analo-
33 Id. at 763.
m United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 778
(lst Cir. 1976).
35 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
36 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
37 The court cited in particular United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), where the defendant
had been first arrested in an automobile for driving
without a license; a search which produced heroin
was held "incident to a lawful arrest." Id. at 224.
" United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
39 532 F.2d at 780.
gous to automobiles in that it could easily
disappear before a warrant could be obtained,
but pointed out that Carroll had made no men-
tion of baggage and that the Supreme Court
had made no definitive ruling on baggage
outside the automobile area.4" After noting that
the government itself was not arguing that any
exigency existed, the court concluded by stating
that it found no exigency justifying the foot-
locker search. The district court's suppression
Qrder was therefore affirmed.
41
The Supreme Court granted certiorari42 to
consider the question of the warrantless foot-
locker search and affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals. 43 The government's argu-
ment, as in the court of appeals, was that the
fourth amendment protects only homes, offices
and private communications and that only in
searches in those contexts should the reasona-
bleness of the search turn on whether a warrant
was procured. Beyond these situations, the
reasonableness of the search should depend
only on whether there was probable cause that
evidence of criminal conduct was present.
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the major-
ity, 44 disagreed, stating that "the Fourth
Amendment 'protects people, not places.
' ' 45
"[M]ore particularly," he went on, "it protects
people from unreasonable government intru-
sions into their legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy. '46 The issue thus became whether the
warrantless search of the footlocker was unrea-
sonable.
The Chief Justice reviewed the history of the
fourth amendment and reasoned that although
the public outcry at the time of the writing of
4 Id. at 781. The court further reasoned that "such
an exception could have considerable impact, as its
premises might seem to apply not only to baggage
but to mail, express packages, and moving freight of
all description." Id. at 782.
41 Senior District Judge Thomsen dissented on the
ground that an officer who has probable cause to
believe contraband is being transported in a suitcase
or locker in his presence has the same authority to
seize and search it without a warrant as he would to
arrest someone committing another sort of felony in
his presence. Id. at 785-86.
42 429 U.S. 814 (1976).
13 United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977).
44 The decision was seven to two, with Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist dissenting. Justice Bren-
nan, who concurred fully, wrote a brief concurrence
in response to Justice Blackmun's dissent.
41 97 S. Ct. at 2481 (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
46 97 S. Ct. at 2481.
[Vol. 68
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the Bill of Rights had centered mainly on
searches of homes, there was no reason to
conclude that the authors felt differently about
searches conducted in public places. He further
reasoned that the protection offered by the
warrant requirement, which insured that a
neutral magistrate had considered the facts of
the situation47 and assured the individual of
the lawful authority of the searching officer,4"
,was equally valuable in or out of the home.
The Chief Justice went on to point out that
warrants had been required for a variety of
searches conducted outside the home: a "bug-
ging" in a public phone booth 49 and searches
of an automobile on private property,50 an
automobile impounded by the police, 51 a hotel
room,52 and an office.' 3 The only unreasonable
government invasions of privacy were not,
then, just those which infringed upon one's
privacy at home. 4
Warrantless searches of automobiles had
been permitted, the Chief Justice conceded,
even when there was little or no danger that
the evidence would be removed, 5 thus the
47Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
There the police had entered a hotel room with no
warrant or probable cause. The quick judgment of
an officer who smelled opium outside the room was
held no substitute for due consideration by a magis-
trate.
48 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
The appellant had argued that warrantless building
inspections were unconstitutional. The Court agreed,
in part because a warrant furnishes assurance of
proper authority.
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'0 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
'" Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
12 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
'3G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 97 S. Ct.
619 (1977).
4The fourth amendment is just one of several
constitutional provisions which protect privacy, as
Justice Stewart pointed out in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, however, the Court had
asserted that a "general right to privacy" was under
the protection of the states. Id. at 350-51. Note that
Katz was decided two years after Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court had
ruled that there was a constitutional right to marital
privacy.
I In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), a
drunk driver's car was impounded in Wisconsin. The
driver claimed to be an off-duty policeman; a local
policeman searched the car which had been left
unguarded out-of-doors for the service revolver he
believed to be stored there. In the course of his
search, he found bloody articles which were later
used as evidence in a murder trial. The Court admit-
mobility of the vehicle could not be the only
rationale upon which the automobile exception
was based. The key, he continued, concerned
expectations of privacy. Such expectations are
much less with respect to an automobile: one
rarely stores one's personal effects there, he
pointed out,5 6 and the contents and occupants
of a car are in plain view on public roads.
5 7
State licensing regulations's and inspection and
custody procedures a made the automobile sub-
ject to public and official scrutiny as well. Such
public display and concern is not present in
regard to luggage, and therefore, since the
defendants had placed personal effects in the
footlocker and had taken the trouble to double-
lock it, their expectations were that their pri-
vacy would be respected. Further, since the
footlocker was safely ensconced in the federal
building, there was no concern or danger that
it might be moved before a warrant could be
obtained.
In response to the government's theory that
a warrantless search of property in possession
of one arrested in a public place is permitted
so long as there is probable cause that the
property contains contraband, the Chief Justice
outlined the rationale upon which the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement is based, relying, like the court of
appeals, upon Chimel. Because the arrestee
might attempt to use a weapon or destroy
evidence, a search to uncover such items was
reasonable within the area of the arrestee's
control. He concluded that:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced
luggage or other personal property not imme-
diately associated with the person of the arrestee
to their exclusive control, and there is no longer
any danger that the arrestee might gain access
ted the evidence as the fruits of a proper, although
warrantless, search designed to protect the public.
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976), the defendant's car had been impounded
after a series of parking violations. A routine search
uncovered marijuana in the car.
In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the
defendant had been arrested on a narcotics charge.
Evidence found in his impounded car one week after
the arrest was held admissible despite the lack of a
warrant.
See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970),
and text accompanying note 27.
56 97 S. Ct. at 2484 (Burger, CJ.) (quoting Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
57 Id.
18 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
" South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
1977]
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to the property to seize a weapon or destroy
evidence, a search of that property is no longer
an incident of the arrest.66
In a footnote, the Chief Justice qualified his
statement to exclude the situation where the
luggage was believed to contain explosives or
other, equally dangerous materials. 6 Because
no other exigency justified the warrantless
search of the footlocker, the judgment of the
court of appeals was affirmed.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, dissented on the ground that he saw no
significant difference between the situation in
Chadwick and that in United States v. Edwards,
62
which upheld the search of personal effects
without a warrant after the arrestee was in jail,
or in those cases involving impounded cars
which had been searched thoroughly, locked
compartments included.63 Because the issuance
of a warrant in a case such as Chadwick would
be, Justice Blackmun believes, a matter of rou-
tine, the fourth amendment protection af-
forded by the majority's holding will have little
practical value. In addition, he went on, the
opinion may have little impact since other doc-
trines will usually sustain warrantless searches
by the police. He reasoned that allowing prop-
erty such as the footlocker to be searched where
a valid arrest had taken place in public would
result in simplifying constitutional law with no
serious diminishing of a citizen's fourth amend-
ment rights. Finally, he pointed out that had
the arrest taken place when the respondents
were seated upon it or standing near it, the
footlocker would have been in their control
and thus searchable. It should be noted, how-
ever, that Justice Brennan in his concurrence
disputed this assertion, reasoning that "control"
of a double-locked, 200-pound footlocker could
not be so easily resolved .64
The Court in Chadwick adhered to its admo-
nition in Katz v. United States"5 and refused to
expand the automobile or the search incident
to arrest exceptions to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement, despite, no doubt, a
temptation to aid the federal agents who had
66 97 S. Ct. at 2485.
61 Id. at 2485 n.9.
62 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
6 See note 55 supra.
64 97 S. Ct. at 2486 (Brennan, J., concurring).
389 U.S. 347 (1967). Also see note 18 supra and
accompanying text.
so relentlessly tracked down drug traffickers.
Justice Blackmun's assertion that allowing the
footlocker to be searched without a warrant as
incident to arrest would not "seriously
derogat[e]"66 a citizen's rights may be true, but
the law has long been drawn along such fine
lines, and noble principles can be eroded in
such an inch-by-inch fashion. As the court of
appeals pointed out, a leap from permitting
searches of cars to permitting searches of
locked personal luggage which happens to be
in a car is a vast one indeed when the new
proposition is logically extended.67 The central
premise upon which the Supreme Court based
its reasoning-that reasonable expectations of
privacy may be intruded upon only by means
of a warrant-is not only valid historically
but is also workable in other sorts of circum-
stances.68 In addition, that premise would seem
to be at the very heart of the fourth amend-
ment.
In United States v. Ramsey, a customs inspector
dealing with international letter class mail69 in
the New York General Post Office noticed that
eight envelopes arriving from Thailand, a
known source of heroin, were particularly
bulky and that all appeared to have been ad-
dressed with the same typewriter. An envelope
was weighed and found to be three times as
heavy as normal letters. The official opened
the envelopes and found a white powder which
tests revealed to be heroin. The envelopes were
then sent to the Washington area, as per their
addresses, and were delivered under the sur-
veillance of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
66 97 S. Ct. at 2489 (Blackmun, Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting).
67 See note 40 supra. A ruling which permitted the
warrantless search of the footlocker would establish
a precedent which could form the basis for future
findings that warrantless searches of similar items-
packages, baggage, freight-were also permissible.
The result would be a whole new exception to the
fourth amendment and a further erosion of its pro-
tections. Chief Justice Burger warned of this sort of
danger in United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973): "The seductive plausibility
of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development
of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third,
fourth, or fifth 'logical' extension occurs.... [T]he
aggregate or end result is one that would never have
been seriously considered in the first instance."
68 See text following note 100 and accompanying
note 120.
69 International letter class mail is similar to domes-
tic first class mail.
[Vol. 68
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tion. One defendant collected the envelopes
from three different addresses and was ar-
rested after giving a second defendant a paper
bag in which officals found six envelopes con-
taining heroin, along with cash and "cutting"
matter for the heroin. The district court denied
defendants' motion to suppress the heroin, and
defendants were convicted of several related
narcotics offenses .70
The court of appeals reversed,7 1 refusing to
accept the government's contention that the
opening of the envelopes in the case at bar was
a border search permitted as an exception to
the fourth amendment. The court noted that a
number of courts have held 72 that packages
moving through international borders may be
subjected to a warrantless search and thus are
included in the border search exception. In-
deed, two circuits73 had gone further and in-
luded letter mail, as well as packages, in the
exception, on the ground that there was no
meaningful difference between the search of
automobiles, baggage, people, and packages
crossing the border and a search of mail cross-
ing the border. The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, however, reasoned that the border search
exception was based on the exigent circum-
stances doctrine. The volume and mobility of
border traffic were seen to be the underlying
reasons for the exception. The court found
little analogy between letters and people or
automobiles as transporters of contraband. Size
71 Appellant Ramsey was convicted of violations of
the following: 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1970), unlawful
importation of heroin; 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1970),
unlawful use of a communication facility; 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) (1970), possession of heroin with intent to
distribute; 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1) (1970), unlaw-
ful receipt and possession of a firearm; 22 D.C.
CODE § 3203 (1973), unlawful possession of a pistol.
Appellant Kelly was convicted of violations of 21
U.S.C. § 952(a) (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1970); 21
U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970).
7 United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
72 United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v.
Galvez, 465 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 922 (1965); United States v. Swede, 326 F.
Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Sohnen,
298 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
7' United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.
1975) (citing United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974)); United
States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.) (per cur-
iam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975).
alone limited the former to only a few possibil-
ities, such as drugs or small jewelry, and these,
the court pointed out, could often be detected
by such external means as trained dogs, x-rays,
or metal detectors. Further, because the Su-
preme Court had unanimously held that au-
thorities were permitted to detain mail in order
to investigate suspicious circumstances or ob-
tain search warrants,7 4 there was no need for
an official to open letter mail without a warrant.
The court of appeals also relied on the spirit
of two recent Supreme Court decisions which
it perceived as attempts to keep the border
exception narrowly-defined. In Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States,75 the appellant, in his automo-
bile, had been stopped by a roving patrol
twenty miles north of the United States-Mexico
border: The Court ruled in a five to four
decision that there was no warrant nor probable
cause for halting the car, and the marijuana
found in the ensuing search could not be used
against the appellant. Two years later, in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,76 the Court held that a
border patrol's judgment that a car contained
"Mexican-looking" people was not a reasonable
basis for stopping it. The respondent's motion
to suppress in his trial for transporting illegal
aliens was thus granted. The Court stated that
"reasonableness . . . depends on a balance be-
tween the public interest and the individual's
right to personal security.
77
Finally, the court of appeals considered the
fact that these were letters which were searched
and quoted Justice Holmes: "[T]he use of the
mails is almost as much a part of free speech as
the right to use our tongues .... "8 Noting
the Supreme Court's special concern when
fourth amendment rights converge with first
amendment rights, as expressed in United States
v. United States District Court.79 and Stanford v.
74 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249
(1970). There, two 12-pound packages of gold coins
mailed from a town in Washington near the Canadian
border had aroused the suspicion of postal authori-
ties and the local police. The Court held that a 29-
hour delay in the delivery did not destroy the efficacy
of the warrant obtained after investigation proved
the officials' suspicions well-founded.
7- 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
7 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
77 Id. at 878.
" United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Demo-
cratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437
(1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).




Texas,80 the court concluded that the risks were
too great to allow international mail to be
opened without a showing of probable cause
and the obtaining of a search warrant from a
neutral magistrate.
The court found little hindrance to the con-
venience of officials in its ruling, especially in
view of the fact that when the customs officials
transferred the envelopes to the District of
Columbia post office, officials there had ob-
tained a warrant before reopening them. The
court, with one dissent, thus reversed the con-
victions.
The Supreme Court granted certioraris in
order to resolve the conflict among the cir-
cuits.8 2 The decision of the court of appeals
was reversed. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority,s3 read the applicable postal stat-
utes4 as authorizing the customs official's act in
this case. The statute reads in part: "Any of
the officers - . . authorized to board or search
vessels may stop, search ... any trunk or
envelope, wherever found, in which he may
have a reasonable cause to suspect there is
merchandise which was imported contrary to
law ...... Noting that the statutory require-
ment of reasonable cause is less than the fourth
amendment's probable cause threshold for a
warrant, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the
bulk and the country of origin of the letters in
the case at bar did form a foundation of reason-
able cause for the customs search. The search
had thus been made in accordance with the
statute.
In a lengthy footnote, 5 Justice Rehnquist
defended his statutory interpretation, rebut-
ting Justice Stevens' dissent. The fact that
postal regulations had not implemented the
statutory authority, first given in 1866, until
1971, and that until then postal officials had
not been allowed to open international mail
without a warrant except in the presence of
and with the consent of the addressee, did not
change the analysis. The dissent's other points
revolved around legislative history, most of it
80 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (warrant to search for com-
munist publications was held too sweeping).
s 429 U.S. 815 (1976).
82 See note 73 and accompanying text.
' The decision was six to three, with Justice Powell
writing a brief concurrence and Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting.
'4 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970) (emphasis added).
s1 97 S. Ct. 1972, 1976-78 n.8 (1977).
ambiguous, as Justice Rehnquist was quick to
point out.
Having determined that the search of the
envelopes was made in accordance with the
statute, Justice Rehnquist then turned to the
constitutionality of the warrantless search. Bor-
der searches, he asserted, "are reasonable sim-
ply by virtue of the fact that they occur at
the border. 8 6 In support, he cited the 1789
customs law8 7 and the 1886 conclusion of the
Court in Boyd v. United States that the passage
of the 1789 act was proof that customs searches
were not considered unreasonable and thus
not prohibited by the fourth amendment.88
Two recent cases dealing with the importation
of obscene matter were cited as well in support
of the recognized reasonableness of border
searches.89
Confronting the issue of letter searches, Jus-
tice Rehnquist reasoned that there was no basis
in the border search exception's rationale for
differentiating between the mode of entry of
mail into the country and that of people or
automobiles. He relied on Cotzhausen v. Nazro9
0
where the Court had declared that "if the mail
is to be left unwatched, and all its sealed con-
tents, even after delivery to the person to whom
addressed, are to be exempt from seizure, ...
dutiable matter of great value may thus be
introduced from foreign countries."'
He went on to point out that the court of
appeals had erred in seeing the border search
exception as one built on the doctrine of exi-
86 Id. at 1979.
V See note 7 supra.
116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
89 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413
U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Thirty-seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). In Reels of Film the
Court ruled that Congress may prohibit the importa-
tion of obscene materials intended for personal use
only. The Court reasoned that border regulation is
within the power granted to Congress by the com-
merce clause of the Constitution and noted that
border searches "rest on different considerations and
different rules of constitutional law from domestic
regulations." 413 U.S. at 125. In Thirty-seven Photo-
graphs the Court ruled that Congress may declare
obscenity contraband and that the seizure by customs
officials of photographs intended for commercial use
was valid.
o 107 U.S. 215 (1882).
91 Id. at 218. However, in Cotzhausen, as the Court
there obliquely revealed, the dutiable matter-a
shawl-had not been seized until it was in the hands
of the addressee and had been opened by her. Justice




gent circumstances. 92 He found the border
search exception analogous to the search inci-
dent to arrest exception and saw neither excep-
tion as based on the doctrine of exigent circum-
stances.
93
As for the court of appeals' view that its
decision in Ramsey was consistent with the spirit
of Brignoni-Ponce and Almeida-Sanchez, Justice
Rehnquist asserted that those decisions were
based on a finding that the searches had not
taken place at a border or its functional equiv-
alent. They were, therefore, inapplicable to
the case at bar.
In his conclusion, Justice Rehnquist pointed
out that because postal regulations strictly for-
bade the reading of foreign letter mail without
a search warrant,94 any chill on first amend-
ment rights was not only "minimal," but also
"wholly subjective."95
Although Justice Rehnquist denied that Ram-
sey is an expansion of the border search excep-
tion to the fourth amendment,96 it seems clear
that the Court's allowance of a warrantless
search of undelivered international mail does
broaden the exception.97 Because authorization
for border searches predates the fourth
amendment itself, it may be that the Court
considers the border search exception excluded
from the Katz rule that fourth amendment
exceptions be kept tightly restricted. Although
the District of Columbia Circuit did not see
things that way, both the Seventh and the
Ninth Circuits have.98 And in view of the fact
that packages may be searched without a war-
rant, to exclude letters would mean drawing a
line at some arbitrary point. When is a bulky
envelope a package and when a letter? How
large may an envelope be and still remain a
letter? Further, as the dissenting judge in the
court of appeals noted, 99 a package can also
92 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
93 In view of the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Chimel that fear of an arrestee's grabbing a weapon
or destroying evidence was the basis for allowing a
warrantless search incident to arrest, it is difficult to
see how Justice Rehnquist arrived at such a categori-
zation of the search incident to arrest exception.
9 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 (1977).
95 Since it would seem that the first amendment
chill is always "subjective," it is not clear just what
Justice Rehnquist meant by this characterization.
96 97 S. Ct. at 1981.
'7 See note 91 supra.
" See note 73 supra.
9 538 F.2d at 423.
contain writings-pamphlets, letters and so
forth-and therefore a first amendment chill
could be seen to exist in permitting their open-
ing as well.
With so much precedent in favor of opening
international mail, it is possible that a point of
no return had been reached; that to be logically
consistent meant either expanding the excep-
tion or overruling the decisions of many courts.
Possibly the necessity for logical extension,
present in Ramsey and not in Chadwick, justifies
the possible first amendment chill of the for-
mer, although even "minimal" and "subjective"
erosions of principle are suspect. 100
In addition, Justice Rehnquist's analysis in
Ramsey, while it parses well logically, fails to
come to grips with several of the court of
appeals' most salient and practical points, in
particular: (1) the ease with which a warrant to
open mail may be obtained, given the Court's
decision that delay for that purpose is permis-
sible; and (2) the fact that much contraband
can be detected by external means such as dogs
and metal detectors. However, considered in
relation to the framework outlined in Chad-
wick-one's reasonable expectations of privacy-
Ramsey fits. The long tradition of border
searches, of both people and mail, makes it
arguably reasonable to expect bulky mail from
Thailand to be searched for illegal drugs.
In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, the
Internal Revenue Service had determined that
an individual taxpayer, who was general man-
ager of the appellant corporation, owed nearly
a million dollars in taxes for the years 1970 and
1971. The taxpayer had filed no returns for
those years and, in addition, was a fugitive
from justice, having escaped from a federal
marshall after being convicted on a charge of
misapplication of national bank funds.10 1 These
factors were considered to jeopardize collection
of the taxes. Consequently, in accordance with
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,102 a jeop-
100 See note 66 and accompanying text.
101 The taxpayer was convicted of a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2 (1969) and 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976), and the
conviction was affirmed in United States v. Cooper,
464 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1972).
102 I.R.C. § 6861(a). The statute reads in relevant
part: "If the Secretary believes that the assessment or
collection of a deficiency . . . will be jeopardized by
delay, he shall ... immediately assess such deficiency




ardy assessment was made. In attempting to
collect the taxes owed, the IRS determined
that the appellant corporation was the tax-
payer's alter-ego. The corporation, supposedly
a car-leasing concern, listed no employees, had
paid no state sales tax and had no license to
conduct business in the area of its location.
However, the corporation owned several very
expensive collectors' cars, and the IRS seized,
without a warrant, two Rolls Royces, three
Stutzes and a Jaguar. All of the automobiles
were taken from public places. Also, with the
aid of a locksmith, the revenue officers en-
tered, again without a warrant, appellant's
place of business on two separate occasions; on
their second visit, furnishings and papers were
seized.
The corporation filed suit against the IRS
and individual agents, claiming wrongful levy
and asking for return of the autos, suplression
of the evidence gained from the search and
damages. The district court's judgment in favor
of the corporation awarded damages in an
undetermined amount, both compensatory and
punitive, against individual revenue agents,
suppressed the use of the seized documents or
photocopies of them, ordered all seized assets
returned and removed all levies against such
assets.
The court of appeals reversed as to all the
critical issues."°3 After concluding that the trial
court had erred in its decision that the corpo-
ration was not the fugitive taxpayer's alter-ego,
the court agreed with the Government that
further error had been committed when the
trial court "entered no independent findings
of fact or conclusions of law but merely ac-
cepted those prepared by appellee."'0 4 The
court found the search and seizure of both the
automobiles and the documents statutorily au-
thorized'0 5 and concluded that the govern-
ment's lien on the property seized was valid.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari'0 6 on
105 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d
935 (10th Cir. 1975). The court, in accordance with a
government concession, affirmed the trial court's
return of stock to the taxpayer's son, an intervener.
"o Id. at 940. The court of appeals noted that the
district court had been condemned twice before for
this practice.
105 I.R.C. § 6331(a), (b). The latter subsection pro-
vides, in relevant part: "The term levy as used in this
title includes the power of distraint and seizure by
any means."
1-6 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
a limited fourth amendment issue, the permis-
sibility of the seizures to satisfy tax assessments,
affirming in part and reversing in part the
decision of the lower court. Justice Blackmun
wrote for a unanimous court. After reviewing
the statutes which provide authority for tax
levies,' 0 7 he pointed out that the levy power
was essential to the country. It was, indeed, its
"lifeblood."' 8 Because the Court had limited
its consideration of the case to the fourth
amendment issue, the court of appeals' deter-
minations that the levies were valid and that
the appellant corporation was the individual
taxpayer's alter-ego were accepted. Thus, Jus-
tice Blackmun reasoned, probable cause existed
for the seizure of the corporation's assets in
satisfaction of the tax liability. The only ques-
tion then became whether warrants were nec-
essary in order to make the seizures of the
automobiles and documents reasonable.
Relying on Murray's lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 0 9 the Court ruled that the
seizure of the automobiles from public places
was not unreasonable where a customs official
had been found to have withheld revenue owed
to the government; his property had been
seized through a title transfer involving no
intrusion onto private property.
The seizure of the documents from appel-
lant's offices was, however, a different matter.
Quoting from Camara v. Municipal Court,"0
Justice Blackmun said, "[O]ne governing prin-
ciple, justifed by history and by current expe-
rience, has consistently been followed: except
in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper con-
sent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been author-
107 I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6331(a), (b).
168 97 S. Ct. at 627 (quoting, Bull v. United States,
295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935)).
00 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). Murray's Lessee is a
prime example of the early judicial interpretation of
the fourth amendment, which, in the tradition of
the English common law, was based on property
rights. Thus the government was entitled to seize
property to which it had a superior claim. This
premise has since been discredited, explained Justice
Brennan in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967), and seizures may be unreasonable under the
fourth amendment even though the government
asserts a superior common-law property interest.
The remedy for the seizure found unreasonable
under the fourth amendment then becomes suppres-
sion, rather than replevin.
"o 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
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ized by a valid search warrant."'' n He then
cited a string of cases in support of the premises
that (1) businesses as well as individuals are
protected by the fourth amendment,' and (2)
even corporations have certain fourth amend-
ment rights.1 3 Warrantless searches of certain
heavily-regulated business, such as gun 4 or
liquor' sales, may be authorized by Congress,
but these were distinguishable from the case at
bar, because the office intrusion was unrelated
to the nature of the appellant-corporation's
business. In addition, although the Constitu-
tion specifically lists the power of the federal
government to "lay and collect Taxes, ' 1" 6 and
although Congress had as early as 1791 passed
an act authorizing tax levies against those who
were delinquent," 7 Justice Blackmun reasoned
that these historical facts should not undermine
the fourth amendment's protection. In a pow-
erful rebuttal of the government's contention,
quoted Madison's argument for the proposed
Bill of Rights that without such protection
general warrants might be used to collect
taxes.1l8
"' 97 S. Ct. at 628-29.
"' See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Go-
Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920).
"' Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946); Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906).
"4 In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972),
a warrantless search of a gun-shop storeroom was
held to be authorized by the Gun Control Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1970).
"' In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72 (1970), the Court held that because
Congress had failed to specify a seizure procedure in
its authorization of liquor dealer inspections, the
fourth amendment applied. Congress might have
authorized warrantless seizure but had not.
"16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
"7 Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 23, 1 Stat. 204.
118 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (1834 ed.), quoted in 97
S. Ct. at 630. Madison had argued:
The General Government has a right to pass all
laws which shall be necessary to collect its reve-
nue; the means for enforcing the collection are
within the direction of the Legislature: may not
general warrants be considered necessary for
this purpose, as well as for some purposes which
it was supposed at the framing of their constitu-
tions the State Governments had in view? If
there was reason for restraining the State Gov-
ernments from exercising this power, there is
The Government argued further that since
IRS statutes curbed agent discretion and since
broad discretion given to building inspectors in
Camara had led the Court there to require a
warrant, that case was not applicable in the
case at bar. Justice Blackmun, however,
pointed out that the applicable statutes in the
present case" 9 were hardly a restraint upon
IRS discretion when, for example, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury could choose between
seizure of property from either public or pri-
vate places. He read the statute as silent on the
subject of invasion of privacy and therefore
considered the case governed by the usual
fourth amendment rule that unless a search of
private property fits into one of the few defined
exceptions to the warrant requirement, it is
unreasonable.
A final Government argument, that its search
was valid under the exigent circumstances doc-
trine, was disposed of summarily by the Court.
Justice Blackmun pointed out that the revenue
agents had waited two days after their first
entry into the offices before returning to seize
the documents. There was, therefore, plenty
of time in which to obtain a warrant.
The Court in G.M. Leasing, as its unanimity
indicates, took an orthodox position 120 on the
fourth amendment. The issues were less com-
plex than those in Chadwick or Ramsey because
no serious attempt was made by the Govern-
ment to persuade the Court that the warrant-
less search of the corporation's offices fit into
an accepted exception to the fourth amend-
ment requirement. However, the case may be
seen to fit nicely within the "reasonable expec-
tations of privacy" framework iterated by Chief
Justice Burger in Chadwick. While an automo-
bile or a bulky letter from Thailand may rea-
sonably be expected to be subjected to govern-
ment regulation and surveillance, the contents
of one's office-its files and furnishings-have
not been traditionally under the eye of the
government. Indeed papers are specifically de-
clared as protected in the fourth amendment
itself.
like reason for restraining the Federal Govern-
ment.
"9 I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6331(a), (b). Section 6331(a)
reads in part: "[I]t shall be lawful for the Secretary
or his delegate to collect such tax ... by levy upon
all property and rights to property ... belonging to
such person .... "
120 See notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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If one were to rely on Chadwick or G.M.
Leasing in order to see just where the Burger
Court is going with regard to the fourth
amendment, the conclusion would be that it is
holding the line on exceptions to the amend-
ment, possibly even retreating from its holding
in United States v. Biswell.'2 ' However, Chadwick,
and Ramsey, both products of a divided Court
unlike, G.M. Leasing, definitely extended the
border exception to the amendment, albeit
only a hair's breadth in view of the widely-
established proposition that packages in inter-
national mail may be subjected to warrantless
search. Ramsey was also consistent with the
rulings of two out of three of the courts of
appeals which had faced the question. 2 The
three recent cases thus give no definitive an-
121 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Also see note 114.
122 Although the D.C. Circuit had in Ramsey ruled
swer as to what the Court will do in its next
fourth amendment cases.
However, if the spirit of and the framework
for analysis set up in Chadwick are adhered to
in the future, that is, if the Court continues to
hold the line on expanding the exceptions to
the fourth amendment and subjects every case
to the test of what reasonable expectations of
privacy were involved, it may well be that
Chadwick will become the most influential of
the three decisions considered here. Certainly,
it is an example of a "hard case" (in view of the
expansive automobile exception precedents)
which seems most in tune with what the framers
of the fourth amendment intended.
against warrantless search of international letter mail,
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits had found similar
searches constitutional. See note 73 supra.
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